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GOLD MEDDLING: HOW THE U.S. OLYMPIC
COMMITTEE OVERPROTECTS THE
OLYMPICS BRAND
I. INTRODUCTION
Few events are as well known and understood as the Olympic
Games. The very word has nearly universal recognition; it evokes
images of the highest level of competition and images of the greatest
athletes in the world completely devoting themselves to a contest with
their peers. In the contest to host the 2016 Summer Olympic Games,
though, the city of Chicago is discovering that it does not enjoy this
kind of all-encompassing competition. Instead, Chicago faces strict
limits on how it can use Olympic-related words and images, including
the word "Olympics" itself.
A federal statute grants the United States Olympic Committee
("U.S.O.C.") an exclusive right to use all Olympic-related words and
images.' In contrast, the rights to use most other words and images
are governed by the federal trademark registration process. 2 This is
not a difference of mere semantics; the U.S.O.C. actually has far more
protection than a typical trademark holder. In theory, this is to give
the U.S.O.C. a greater ability to raise funds for the U.S. Olympic
team. In practice, though, this has overprotected the U.S.O.C.'s fun-
draising interests. The protection gives the U.S.O.C. effective control
over all aspects of the Olympic "brand". This control may be neces-
sary in terms of Chicago's Olympic bid, but it has proven to be a ma-
jor hindrance for the country as a whole.
Chicago is only realizing this standard now that the U.S.O.C. has
begun to enforce its rights in the city. In 2005, the committee forced
the Improv Olympic Theater to change its name to the 1.0. Theater.3
In 2007, the U.S.O.C. forced the city to abandon a logo it had been
using because the logo resembled the "Olympic torch" mark.4 In both
cases, it was unclear if the U.S.O.C.'s fundraising interests were actu-
ally threatened, but the committee still forced the theater and the city
to stop using the Olympic "brand". The U.S.O.C. did not actually sue
either entity, but it did not have to; the U.S.O.C.'s political and finan-
1. Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U.S.C. § 220506.
2. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1041-1141.
3. Emily Bryson York, No Joke: Olympics Muscle Theater Crain's Chicago Business (2005).
4. Phil Hersh and Mark Caro, Torch on Chicago logo gets scorched, Chicago Tribune (2007).
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cial power, combined with its certainty of success in any legal action,
was enough to convince the theater and the city to give in.
For the country as a whole, we may have little problem with some
of this. The "torch" and "ring" marks of the Olympics, for example,
are strong, iconic images with obvious creative and promotional value.
It seems proper- if not necessary- that they somehow be protected.
Moreover, the U.S.O.C. seems like the obvious beneficiary of such
protection, given that it is responsible for fielding the country's
Olympic team and thus has a very definite fundraising interest.
However, we may not be so comfortable with limiting the use of a
single word, especially one as well known and evocative as "Olym-
pics". In terms of free speech, it seems unfair to put strict rules on
where, when, and how that word can be used. Even if those rules are
needed, though, it is not at all clear that the U.S.O.C. deserves the
protection of exclusive use of the word. It is unclear how broader
usage of "Olympics" could possibly hurt the U.S.O.C.'s fundraising.
Also, while the U.S.O.C. generally guards its fundraising interests
jealously, it has not always been vigilant about protecting its right to
the word "Olympics". For example, the theater kept its original name
for 20 years before the U.S.O.C. contacted itA In this time, the thea-
ter built up its own goodwill in the "Improv Olympics" name, but that
goodwill meant nothing in the face of the U.S.O.C.'s exclusive rights.
These exclusive rights, then, have created important concerns in terms
of free speech and trademark equity.
This article will first examine the U.S.O.C.'s exclusive rights under
federal law. The Amateur Sports Act of 1978 ("A.S.A.") granted the
U.S.O.C. these rights. 6 However, the Lanham Act's trademark regis-
tration process governs most other exclusive rights to use words and
images. Thus, the U.S.O.C.'s rights are obviously distinct from those
of a typical trademark holder. According to litigation under the
A.S.A., the U.S.O.C. actually has far more power than any typical
trademark holder. However, while the U.S.O.C. may have legitimate
fundraising interests that lead to the passage of the A.S.A., the statute
actually goes too far. This article will show that in many cases, the
A.S.A. overprotects the U.S.O.C.'s interests and does a disservice to
the country as a whole.
Second, this article will examine how the U.S.O.C. has tried to en-
force its rights in light of Chicago's bid to host the 2016 Summer
Olympic Games. While it is unclear if the U.S.O.C.'s fundraising in-
5. York. 2005.
6. 36 U.S.C. § 220506.
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terests were actually at risk, the committee still used its political influ-
ence, financial largesse and legal advantages to stop the use of any
Olympic-related words and images in the city. Interestingly, the
U.S.O.C. managed to do all of this without resorting to any litigation.
These incidents, then, are the most recent- and the most telling- illus-
trations of how the U.S.O.C. controls the Olympic "brand", even
when its financial interests are not at stake.
Finally, this article will propose an alternative to the U.S.O.C.'s ex-
clusive rights under the A.S.A. A simple trademark, as governed by
the Lanham Act 7 , would still protect the U.S.O.C.'s fundraising inter-
ests, but it would not inhibit anyone else as the A.S.A. has. The very
factors that determine trademark infringement would also determine
if the U.S.O.C.'s fundraising interests are at risk. Thus, the U.S.O.C.
would be able to concentrate on actual threats, and everyone else
would be able to use these very evocative words and images. A sim-
ple trademark, then, would successfully balance the interests of the
U.S.O.C. and the general population.
II. THE AMATUER SPORTS ACT
A. Statutory Law
The U.S.O.C.'s control over the Olympic "brand" comes from the
Amateur Sports Act of 1978.8 The A.S.A. gives the U.S.O.C. an "ex-
clusive right to use" the words "Olympiad", "Olympian", "Pan-
America", and even "Olympics" itself.9 It also gives the U.S.O.C. the
exclusive right to use several images, including the "five interlocking
rings" mark of the Olympic games and the "torch" mark of the Pan-
American Sports Organization.' 0 Finally, the A.S.A. gave the
U.S.O.C. the exclusive right to use any combination of these words
and images." Under the A.S.A., the U.S.O.C. can authorize anyone
else to use these words and images.12 This is most commonly seen in
the many promotions for the "official sponsors of the U.S. Olympic
team", and has proven to be a potent fundraising tool for the
U.S.O.C.'3 However, if anyone uses any of these words or images
without permission, the U.S.O.C. can successfully sue them for in-
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141.
8. 36 U.S.C. § 220506.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Stop the Olympic Prison v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 489 F.Supp. 1112, 1114 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
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fringement simply by showing that the words or images were used.14
The only exception to this is that several businesses using "Olympic"
before the A.S.A. was passed were allowed to continue using it, even
without the U.S.O.C.'s permission.' 5 In other words, the A.S.A. gives
the U.S.O.C. an effective monopoly over all Olympic-related words
and images, and complete control over how they can be used.
Congress was willing to give the U.S.O.C. this advantage because
without it, the U.S.O.C. was in danger of falling behind other national
Olympic organizations. This is because unlike most countries, the
U.S. does not fund its Olympic team with public money.'6 Thus, the
U.S.O.C. is completely dependent on private donations. Congress still
wanted a successful Olympic program, though, so it wanted to make it
easier for the U.S.O.C. to solicit those donations.' 7 Congress ulti-
mately decided that the best way to do this was to give the U.S.O.C.
complete control over Olympic-related words and images so that the
U.S.O.C. would not have to compete with anyone else using the
Olympic "brand.""'
To fully understand the significance of the A.S.A., it is important to
understand the differences between the U.S.O.C.'s exclusive rights
and typical trademark rights. Trademarks are governed by the Lan-
ham Act, which requires that a potential holder register their mark
before they can enjoy the benefits of exclusive use.19 These marks can
include words, images, or combinations of the two, but they must
identify and distinguish the holder's goods or products. 2 0 After the
mark is registered, the Lanham Act protects the holder against "fraud
by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imita-
tions of registered trademarks." 2' To succeed on a claim under the
Lanham Act, a plaintiff must show that their mark is protected and
that the defendant's use of the mark is likely to cause confusion. 22
Proving confusion has often been difficult, but courts have identi-
fied eight factors that help decide that issue. No factor is determina-
tive; instead, these factors act as a sort of common sense "balancing
test". 23 The first factor is the strength of the mark.24 A generic mark
14. San Francisco Arts and Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 528 (1987).
15. O-M Bread, Inc. v. U.S.O.C., 65 F.3d 933, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 25188.
16. U.S. Olympic Committee v. Intelicense Corp., 737 F.2d 263, 266 (C.A. 2 1984).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1501.
20. Packman v. Chicago Tribune Company, 267 F.3d 628, 638 (C.A. 7 2001).
21. Id.
22. Jordache Enterprises v. Levi Strauss & Co., 841 F.Supp. 506, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
23. Id. at 515.
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that only describes the product is weaker than a more creative or fan-
ciful mark. The second factor is the degree of similarity between the
original mark and the defendant's mark.25 The more similarities be-
tween the two marks, the more likely they are to cause confusion. The
third factor is the proximity of the products. 2 6 If the products the
holder and the defendant put out are also similar, then there is a
greater chance of confusion, and thus infringement. The fourth factor
is the likelihood of "bridging the gap". 2 7 If the holder or the defen-
dant plans enter the other's market (if they are even in separate mar-
kets at all), then there is a greater chance of confusion. The fifth
factor is actual confusion. 28 Actual confusion can mean either anec-
dotal or statistical evidence that consumers have confused the two
marks and products. The sixth factor is good faith. 29 If the defendant
is not trying to "cash in" on the holder's reputation by using the mark,
there is a lesser chance of confusion and infringement. The seventh
factor is the quality of the defendant's product. 30 If it is actually a
well-made product that could survive in the market without the
holder's mark, there is a lesser chance of confusion. The final factor is
the sophistication of potential customers.3 ' If the customers are savvy
enough to tell the products apart even with the similar marks, then
there is obviously a lesser chance of confusion and infringement.
Taken together, these factors determine the likelihood of confusion
and even the likelihood of an actual threat to the trademark holder.
However, this extensive analysis is not used in A.S.A. claims because
the A.S.A. does not require a plaintiff to prove a likelihood of
confusion.32
Congress passed the Lanham Act and the A.S.A. with very different
motivations. Congress did not pass the Lanham Act to benefit anyone
in particular, but to make business practices and advertising fairer.
Specifically, Congress intended the Lanham Act to eliminate decep-
tion and unfair competition in marketing goods and services.33 Con-
gress also hoped that the act would protect the trademark holder's
creativity and goodwill by prohibiting the use of confusingly similar
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. San Francisco, 483 U.S. at 530.
33. Jordache, 841 F.Supp at 514.
2008] 61
62 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
marks.3 4 Thus, the differences between the U.S.O.C.'s rights and typi-
cal trademark rights stem from the very ideas behind the A.S.A. and
the Lanham Act.
B. Case Law
These differences do not end at statutory structure or legislative in-
tent, though. In fact, the case law following the A.S.A. shows that it
actually grants the U.S.O.C. far more protection than any trademark
would. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Committee was the first case to show just how much more protection
the U.S.O.C. had under the A.S.A. 3 5 In San Francisco, San Francisco
Arts and Athletics, Inc. (SFAA) was planning to host an event it
called the "Gay Olympic Games". 3 6 To raise funds for this event, it
sold t-shirts, buttons and bumper stickers with "Gay Olympic Games"
printed on them. 3 7 There was no indication that anyone thought these
"Gay Olympic Games" were connected to the U.S. Olympic team, or
that anyone donating to the "Gay Olympic Games" would also have
donated to the U.S.O.C.38 Nonetheless, the U.S.O.C. asked SFAA to
change the name, and sued when the organization refused.39
The Supreme Court ruled that SFAA had infringed the U.S.O.C.'s
rights. 4 0 The Court reasoned that because the U.S.O.C. did not actu-
ally hold a trademark, but rather specific, exclusive rights under the
A.S.A., the analysis for trademark infringement did not apply.41 Spe-
cifically, the Court found that confusion was irrelevant to any action
under the A.S.A. 4 2 Thus, even if it was unlikely that anyone would
confuse the "Gay Olympic Games" with the actual Olympics, SFAA
still infringed the U.S.O.C.'s rights. 43 It also found that because the
U.S.O.C. did not hold a Lanham Act trademark, the statutory de-
fenses enumerated in the Lanham Act were not available.44 Finally,
the Court found that even though the U.S.O.C. chooses when and
where to enforce the Amateur Sports Act and that it sometimes does
so inconsistently, that is no indication of discriminatory enforce-
34. Id.
35. San Francisco, 483 US at 529-30.
36. Id. at 525-526.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 526.
39. Id at 527.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 530.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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ment.4 5 Put simply, if someone used an Olympic-related word or im-
age, then they violated the U.S.O.C.'s rights, even if they did not
threaten the U.S.O.C.'s fundraising. With this ruling, the Court made
it clear that the U.S.O.C. had far more power than any mere trade-
mark holder.
The U.S.O.C. was not shy about exercising this power. In U.S.O.C.
v. Intelicense Corp, it sued a marketing firm for publishing pictograms
using the "rings" mark.4 6 The firm had permission from the Interna-
tional Olympic Committee (I.O.C.) and only published the pictograms
to promote the U.S. presence in the Olympic Games. 4 7 In effect, then,
the U.S.O.C. created a rift with a natural ally. The firm, like the
U.S.O.C., was simply trying to promote the Olympic games and the
U.S. role in them. However, because the firm was also contacting cor-
porate sponsors to support its efforts, it probably posed a threat to the
U.S.O.C.'s fundraising interests. 48
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals certainly thought so, and it
ruled that the firm had violated the U.S.O.C.'s exclusive rights. 4 9 The
court held that the fact that the firm used the "rings" mark was
enough to prove that it had violated the U.S.O.C.'s rights.5 0 The fact
that the I.O.C. had given the firm permission was irrelevant; the
U.S.O.C. held the rights, so the I.O.C. had no authority in this area.5 1
This case, then, made it clear that the U.S.O.C. was the ultimate au-
thority on how Olympic-related words and images could be used in
the U.S. Moreover, the U.S.O.C. showed that it would not spare
someone simply because they were also trying to promote U.S. partic-
ipation in the Olympics.
In O-M Bread, Inc. v. U.S.O.C., the U.S.O.C. sued a bread company
for using the word "Olympic". 52 The bread company began using
"Olympic" to promote its products before the A.S.A., so it had a
"grandfather" right to use the word.53 The company was now trying
to expand its business to include a new line of products called
"Olympic Kids". 54 Once again, it was unclear if the bread company
actually affected the U.S.O.C.'s fundraising. The Court of Appeals
45. Id. at 523.
46. U.S. O.C, 737 F2d at 265.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 269.
50. Id. at 267.
51. Id. at 269.
52. O-M Bread, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 25188.
53. Id. at 936.
54. Id.
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for the Federal Circuit ruled that this expansion violated the
U.S.O.C.'s rights.55 The court reasoned that the company's "grandfa-
ther" right did not include any new products. 56 This was an important
limitation on the "grandfather" right, which was one of the few excep-
tions to the U.S.O.C.'s total control of the "Olympic" brand. Also,
this case is yet another example of the U.S.O.C. defending its rights to
the Olympic "brand" even when its fundraising interests are not
threatened.
Finally, in Stop the Olympic Prison v. U.S.O.C., the U.S.O.C. sued
an organization that protested converting the Lake Placid Olympic
village into a prison.57 The Stop the Olympic Prison organization
(S.T.O.P.) used the word "Olympic" in all of its materials, and even
distributed posters to promote its cause.58 However, there was no evi-
dence that these sales affected the U.S.O.C.'s donations. The federal
court for the southern district of New York ruled that S.T.O.P. did not
infringe the U.S.O.C.'s rights. 59 The court affirmed certain fair uses of
even the U.S.O.C.'s heavily protected images and words, including
news reports and political discourse. 60 Thus, S.T.O.P. could use the
word "Olympic" because the word was central to the political issue
they were advocating. It would have been very hard indeed to debate
the proper uses of the former Olympic village if the competing sides in
the debate could not use the word "Olympic". Nonetheless, the
U.S.O.C. was willing to sue over the use of that very word, even when
its fundraising interests were not at risk. It may have only been trying
to protect its rights, but it was still willing to shut down a very impor-
tant political debate just to protect its ability to easily raise money.
III. THE U.S.O.C. AND CHICAGO
The U.S.O.C. has continued to jealously protect its fundraising in-
terests, even when someone else has built up their own brand. The
Improv Olympic Theater opened on the north side of Chicago in
1980.61 In 1997, the theater added a second location in Los Angeles. 62
It is unclear if anyone actually thought the theater was connected to
the U.S. Olympic team, and it seems unlikely that the theater hurt the
U.S.O.C.'s fundraising efforts; someone could both patronize the the-
55. Id. at 938.
56. Id.
57. Stop the Olympic Prison v. U.S.O.C, 489 F.Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
58. Id. at 1114.
59. Id. at 1118.
60. Id.
61. York, 2005.
62. Id.
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ater and donate to the U.S.O.C., but the two are hardly in direct com-
petition. Nonetheless, in 2001, the U.S.O.C. contacted the theater and
asked it to change its name.63
At first, the theater was reluctant to do So.64 After all, it had held
its name for 20 years and built up a considerable reputation with it.
However, the U.S.O.C. threatened to sue, and it was no empty
threat.65 The U.S.O.C. had the resources to carry out any suit, espe-
cially compared to the theater. The U.S.O.C. had $240 million in rev-
enue, while the theater had only $1.3 million.66 Moreover, based on
A.S.A. case law, the U.S.O.C. was almost certain to prevail in the suit.
After all, the U.S.O.C. would not have had to prove the typical trade-
mark analysis factors, so it did not matter that there was little chance
of confusion or direct competition. A court would find that the thea-
ter violated the U.S.O.C.'s rights simply because the theater used the
word "Olympics". Given all of this, the theater had little choice but to
agree to the U.S.O.C.'s demands. In 2005, the theater changed its
name to the 1.0. Theater. 67
The U.S.O.C. has continued to enforce its rights, even in light of
Chicago's campaign to host the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. The
city began its campaign in 2006.68 Part of the campaign involved solic-
iting private donations to fund the city's efforts.69 To promote the
campaign, Chicago used a logo consisting of a torch superimposed
over the city's skyline. 70 This logo may have posed a threat to the
U.S.O.C.'s fundraising interests. While there was no evidence of con-
fusion, it is certainly possible that Chicago was competing with the
U.S.O.C. for donations. Both, after all, were trying to fund Olympic
campaigns. That being the case, it was even possible that someone
might have thought that the two were connected, though the U.S.O.C.
never showed that that was the case.
In April of 2007, the U.S.O.C. chose Chicago as the single city in
the U.S. that could enter the international competition to host the
games.71 In May, the U.S.O.C. informed Chicago that the city could
not use the "torch" logo. 7 2 Chicago voluntarily changed the logo,
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Hersh and Caro, 2007.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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though it probably had little choice.73 Because Chicago did use a
torch in its logo, the U.S.O.C. would have succeeded in any suit. In
fact, the U.S.O.C. probably could have succeeded even if it held only a
typical copyright because there was a possibility of confusion and
competition. Perhaps more importantly, Chicago's campaign to host
the Olympics could hardly afford the bad publicity of a feud with the
U.S.O.C. Chicago, then, was practically forced to abandon its logo,
although it can bring it back if the city becomes a finalist in the
competition. 74
It is important to note that the U.S.O.C. did not need to resort to a
lawsuit in either case. Its financial, political, and legal advantages
were more than enough to convince the theater and the city to meet
the committee's demands. Nonetheless, these situations once again
expose some of the flaws of the U.S.O.C.'s exclusive rights. It seems
unfair to make the theater change its name. The theater, after all, had
been operating under its name for 20 years. It had even added a sec-
ond location under that name. Obviously, it had built up tremendous
goodwill with the word "Olympic" in its name. Moreover, the theater
hardly seemed like a threat to the U.S.O.C.'s fundraising. Again, the
two entities were not in direct competition, and their revenues bare
that out; the theater's $1.3 million in revenue is a drop in the bucket
compared to the U.S.O.C.'s $240 million. Chicago, though, may actu-
ally have been competing with the U.S.O.C. in some way, as both
were soliciting private donations for the Olympics.
All in all, though, the U.S.O.C.'s zealous enforcement has taken a
toll in Chicago. Even the committee itself may have been hurt. After
all, if potential donors see the committee as petty enough to go after
theater names and city logos, its credibility- and thus, its ability to
raise funds- will surely suffer. If that happens, even the advantages of
the A.S.A. may not be enough to bail out the U.S.O.C.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE: THE LANHAM AcT
It is obvious, then, that we need a better way to balance the
U.S.O.C.'s fundraising interests with everyone else's interests in using
these very evocative words and images. Fortunately, there is already a
framework to do just that- the Lanham Act itself. In fact, the very
analysis used to determine confusion under the Lanham Act would
also effectively determine when the U.S.O.C. actually needs legal
protection.
73. Id.
74. Id.
[Vol. 5:57
GOLD MEDDLING
A. How the Lanham Act would work for the U.S.O.C.
Any confusion involving the Olympic "brand" would almost cer-
tainly hurt the U.S.O.C.'s fundraising interests. After all, if someone
actually thought that a product or another event was related to the
Olympics, they may be more willing to spend money on that product
or event, or even donate to it. This would of course mean that they
had less money to donate to the U.S.O.C. It would also force the
U.S.O.C. to spend resources clarifying the relationship and making
sure potential donors know how to actually support the committee.
However, if a use of the Olympic "brand" was not likely to cause any
confusion, the U.S.O.C.'s interests would not be threatened in this
way. The U.S.O.C.'s fundraising interests would not need any legal
protection, and it would actually be unfair to make the other entity
give up the use. The Lanham Act's eight-factor confusion analysis
would effectively determine when the U.S.O.C.'s fundraising interests
are at risk. Moreover, it would determine when it would be unfair to
enforce the U.S.O.C.'s rights against someone else.
Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co. illustrates how the
confusion analysis could also analyze potential threats.75 In Jordache,
Jordache Enterprises, Inc. ("Jordache") sought a declaration that it
had not infringed Levi Strauss & Co.'s trademark ("Levi"). 7 6
Jordache had introduced a line of jeans called "Jordache Basics 101",
while Levi held a trademark for its line of "501" jeans.77 The federal
court in the southern district of New York refused to declare that
Jordache did not infringe Levi's trademark.78 The court reasoned that
it could not determine if Jordache's mark caused confusion or a threat
to Levi.79 The strength of Levi's mark, the poor quality of Jordache's
product, and the high sophistication of the customers indicated that
Jordache's use of the mark unfairly threatened Levi, but there was no
enough evidence to determine the other five factors.s0 The court,
then, could not make a decision because doing so on only this evi-
dence would have been unfair to Jordache.si If the U.S.O.C. held a
trademark for the elements of the Olympic "brand", the analysis
would be very similar. If the confusion factors showed that the
U.S.O.C.'s fundraising interests were actually at risk, the committee
75. Jordache, 841 F.Supp. 506.
76. Id. at 510.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 521.
79. Id.
80. Id.at 520-21
81. Id.
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would no doubt succeed on an infringement suit. If, however, it was
unclear that there was a real danger to the U.S.O.C., the defendant,
out of fairness, would prevail.
This is not the only benefit of the Lanham Act for anyone else who
wants to use the Olympic "brand". Trademark law has a broader con-
cept of fair use, so any other user would have another important, but
hardly unwarranted, protection. Packman v. Chicago Tribune Com-
pany illustrates fair use under the Lanham Act.82 In Packman, a
woman sued the Chicago Tribune for infringing her trademark over
the phrase "The Joy of Six."8 3 The trademark referred to "entertain-
ment services in the nature of basketball games." 84 The Tribune used
it in a headline referring to the Chicago Bulls' sixth championship.85
The Tribune then printed and sold t-shirts with the headline printed
on them. 86
The federal district court in the northern district of Illinois ruled
that the Tribune did not infringe the woman's copyright. 7 The court
reasoned that the paper used the phrase in a journalistic enterprise;
thus, it was a non-trademark "fair" use.88 Moreover, the paper used
the phrase descriptively and did not act in bad faith, so there was little
chance of confusion.89 The court, then, protected the paper's interest
in using the phrase, even though the paper eventually used it for com-
mercial purposes. If the U.S.O.C. also held a trademark, courts would
probably find a similarly broad sweep of fair use. Someone could thus
use the U.S.O.C.'s marks for non-trademark purposes or even for
commercial purposes so long as there was no chance of confusion.
This again seems fair, so it still seems like the Lanham Act would
correctly balance everyone's interests.
The essential question for the U.S.O.C., though, is what it could
actually trademark. The committee could easily trademark the
"torch" and "rings" images. These images have become so well
known that they certainly identify and distinguish the Olympic Games
from any other event. Moreover, these images are so distinctive and
creative that they would be considered very strong marks and garner
more protection. The U.S.O.C., then, could almost certainly trade-
82. Packman, 267 F.3d 628
83. Id. at 633.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 634.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 647.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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mark these images, and would start out in a strong position in any
infringement case.
The word "Olympics" and all of its permutations are a bit more
complicated, but the U.S.O.C. could still probably trademark them.
The words easily identify and distinguish the event, but they are also
incredibly common words. Some have argued that the words are actu-
ally too common to trademark because removing them from general
usage would be unfair to anyone besides the U.S.O.C.9o Also, the
U.S.O.C. did not create the words; in fact, they predate the U.S.O.C.
by centuries. 91 Even if the words could be trademarked, then, there is
no indication that the U.S.O.C. (or anyone else, for that matter) de-
serves the protection of such a trademark.
The Supreme Court has rejected these arguments, though. In San
Francisco, the Court flatly said that the word "Olympics" was not too
common to be trademarked. 92 The Court also said that the U.S.O.C.
could logically hold that trademark because the U.S.O.C. is at least
partially responsible for establishing the words' distinctive values and
goodwill. 93 Thus, the U.S.O.C. could probably trademark these
words. The U.S.O.C., then, could trademark all of the major elements
of the Olympic "brand".
B. Applying the Lanham Act to Chicago
This does not mean, though, that the U.S.O.C. would retain abso-
lute control over these words and images. Other entities like the 1.0.
Theater would have significantly more opportunities to use the
Olympic "brand". In the theater's situation, there would logically
seem to be little chance of confusion and little risk to the U.S.O.C.'s
fundraising interests. The Lanham factors bear this out. First, the
word "Olympics" would be a weak mark because it only describes the
event. Second, the marks would be only somewhat similar. While
both use the word "Olympics", the theater adds a whole extra word in
front of it. This would not make it a completely different mark, but it
would mitigate the similarities. Third, the products- a team competing
in international sporting events and comedy shows at a local theater-
are not proximate at all. Fourth, there is obviously little chance that
the U.S.O.C. is going to "bridge the gap" into the theater market. The
fifth factor, actual confusion, would be hard to prove either way, but it
seems unlikely that anyone actually thought a small theater on the
90. San Francisco, 483 U.S. at 531.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Idat 537
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north side of Chicago was actually connected to the U.S. Olympic
team. The sixth factor, the theater's good faith, would also be hard to
determine. However, it is at least possible that the theater used the
word "Olympics" because of its widespread recognition, not to take
advantage of the U.S.O.C.'s goodwill. Seventh, the quality of the the-
ater's product is obviously subjective. It is also quite different from
the U.S.O.C.'s product, so there seems to be no fair way to measure
this factor. Finally, the potential customers- in this case, patrons of
the theater and donors to the U.S.O.C.- are likely to be sophisticated,
or at least sophisticated enough to tell the difference between a thea-
ter and a sporting event.
The first, third, fourth, and eighth factors strongly indicate that
there is no confusion, while the fifth and sixth factors weakly point to
the same conclusion. The seventh factor seems impossible to deter-
mine, and the second factor indicates confusion, albeit weakly. Over-
all, this analysis would probably show that there is no confusion, and
thus, no threat to the U.S.O.C.'s fundraising interests. More impor-
tantly, it shows that it would be unfair and unnecessary to make the
theater change its name.
The U.S.O.C. would still be able to act when its fundraising inter-
ests are actually at risk, though. It could, for example, still stop the
city of Chicago from using the "torch" logo. In this situation, it logi-
cally seems like there is a much greater chance of confusion and harm
to the U.S.O.C. Again, the confusion factors prove this to be the case.
First, the "torch" mark is very strong. Second, the marks are some-
what similar. Once again, Chicago's additions could mitigate this sim-
ilarity, but not completely undo it. Third, the products are actually
somewhat proximate. The U.S.O.C. is trying to send a team to the
Olympics, while Chicago is trying to host the Olympics. Both solicit
private donations to reach their goals. These similarities are not over-
whelming, but they are not ignorable, either. Fourth, the U.S.O.C.
may not have any plans to bridge the gap into the Olympic hosting
market, but it is already heavily involved in the process. It did choose
Chicago to be the U.S. representative to the competition, after all.
Fifth, actual confusion seems possible. It is very reasonable to assume
that Chicago and the U.S.O.C. are working together. The U.S.O.C.
would have to present some evidence of this, though. Sixth, it would
once again be hard to determine good faith. However, Chicago might
have been trying to promote its bid by using an iconic image, not by
taking advantage of the U.S.O.C.'s goodwill. Seventh, the quality of
Chicago's bid remains to be seen, but there is no reason to think that
it would be particularly poor. Finally, donors to Olympic teams and
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civic programs are likely to be very savvy. They are, after all, contrib-
uting huge sums of money, so many of them would try to understand
where their money is going.
The first five factors heavily indicate confusion. The sixth and sev-
enth factors could indicate that there is no confusion, but it would
depend on the exact evidence presented. The final factor probably
indicates that there is no confusion. Overall, though, it seems clear
that Chicago's use of a "torch" logo would probably cause confusion
and harm to the U.S.O.C.'s interests. In this case, then, it would be
fair to stop Chicago from using the logo. In fact, it would be unfair to
the U.S.O.C. if it could not stop the city.
It is worth noting that the U.S.O.C.'s most powerful fundraising
tool is its ability to designate corporate sponsors as "official sponsors
of the U.S. Olympic Team." 94 One only need only to look at the num-
ber of products that advertise this distinction to realize how coveted it
is." The Lanham Act would have no effect on the U.S.O.C.'s power
in this respect; the U.S.O.C. could still give others permission to use
its marks. Even though the U.S.O.C. would generally have less power
under a trademark, it would still have its most important tool.
It is clear, then, that the Lanham Act could balance all of the com-
peting interests far better than the A.S.A. has. The confusion analysis
would show when the U.S.O.C.'s fundraising interests are at risk and
when it would be unfair to stop someone else from using the Olympic
"brand". The general population would have more opportunities to
use these important words and images, while the U.S.O.C. would still
have no trouble raising funds for the U.S. Olympic Team. In a way,
the A.S.A. only protects the U.S.O.C. The Lanham Act, however,
could protect everyone.
V. CONCLUSION
It is tempting to dismiss the problems with the U.S.O.C.'S exclusive
rights as unimportant. Even though it is unfair, the use of a handful of
words and images seems like only a minor concern in the legal world
and the sports world. The city of Chicago and the 1.0. Theater appar-
ently did not think the issue was worth going to court over, after all.
Then again, the A.S.A. grants the U.S.O.C. absolute control over the
Olympic "brand", so they probably had no choice.
To dismiss these concerns, then, we would have to ignore the many
concrete and disturbing effects of the A.S.A. Theaters and bread com-
94. Stop the Olympic Prison, 489 F.Supp. at 1114.
95. Id.
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panies have had to change names. Grassroots political organizations
have had to go to court just to defend their right to debate. And none
of these groups have actually posed a threat to the U.S.O.C.'s ability
to field and fund an Olympic Team.
The inequity of the A.S.A. is clear. A solution is also obvious; the
Lanham Act, with its focus on confusion and actual harm, would ef-
fectively and efficiently determine when the U.S.O.C. needs legal pro-
tection. It would also determine when such protection would be
unfair to another party using the Olympic "brand". The U.S.O.C., of
course, would fiercely lobby against any change in its exclusive rights.
It would argue that a change would force it to compete for attention
and engage in lengthy legal proceedings to defend its fundraising in-
terests. This argument falls flat, though. Anyone who actually
threatened those interests would still be guilty of infringement under
the Lanham Act and could be sued accordingly. Anyone who did not
pose such a threat should probably not be sued in the first place.
Moreover, the U.S.O.C. funds the U.S. Olympic team. It is the sin-
gle organization charged with finding the best athletes in the country
and sending them to the world's premiere athletic event. That being
the case, perhaps the U.S.O.C. should not be so afraid of a little
competition.
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